The Anti-Federalist Papers
During the period from the drafting and proposal of the federal Constitution in September, 1787, to its ratification in 1789 there was an intense debate on ratification. The principal arguments in favor of it were stated in the series written by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay called the Federalist Papers, although they were not as widely read as numerous independent local speeches and articles.
The arguments against ratification appeared in various forms, by various authors, most of whom used a pseudonym. Collectively, these writings have become known as the Anti-Federalist Papers. We here present some of the best and most widely read of these. They contain warnings of dangers from tyranny that weaknesses in the proposed Constitution did not adequately provide against, and while some of those weaknesses were corrected by adoption of the Bill of Rights, others remained, and some of these dangers are nowcoming to pass.
The Anti Federalist Authors
| A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT : Mercy Warren A COUNTRYMAN : DeWitt Clinton A CUSTOMER A DEMOCRATIC FEDERALIST A FARMER A FARMER AND PLANTER A FEDERALIST A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN A GEORGIAN A NEWPORT MAN A REPUBLICAN FEDERALIST : James Warren AGRIPPA : James Winthrop ALFRED AN AMERICAN AN OBSERVER AN OFFICER OF THE LATE CONTINENTAL ARMY : William Findley AN OLD WHIG AMICUS ARISTOCROTIS BRUTUS : Robert Yates BRUTUS JUNIOR CANDIDUS : Benjamin Austin CATO : George Clinton CENTINEL : Samuel or George Bryan CINCINNATUS DELIBERATOR HAMPDEN |
HELVIDIUS PRISCUS : James Warren JOHN HUMBLE LEONIDAS MASSACHUSETTENSIS MONTEZUMA PHILADELPHIENSIS PHILANTHROPOS PLEBIAN : Melancthon Smith REPUBLICUS SYDNEY : Robert Yates THE FEDERAL FARMER : Richard Henry Lee THE PLAIN DEALER : Spencer Roane THE YEOMANRY OF MASSACHUSETTS VOX POPULI WILLIAM PENN Consider Arms Samuel Field William Grayson Patrick Henry John Lansing Gilbert Livingston Luther Martin George Mason Malichi Maynard Eleazer Oswald John F. Mercer Joseph Taylor |
The Anti-Federalist Papers
| #1: | General Introduction: A Dangerous Plan of Benefit Only to The “Aristocratick Combination.” |
| #2: | We Have Been Told of Phantoms. |
| #3: | New Constitution Creates a National Government; Will Not Abate Foreign Influence; Dangers of Civil War And Despotism. |
| #4: | Foreign Wars, Civil Wars, and Indian Wars — Three Bugbears. |
| #5: | Scotland and England — A Case in Point. |
| #6: | The Hobgoblins of Anarchy And Dissensions Among The States. |
| #7: | Adoption of The Constitution Will Lead to Civil War. |
| #8: | The Power Vested in Congress of Sending Troops For Suppressing Insurrections Will Always Enable Them to Stifle The First Struggles of Freedom. |
| #9: | A Consolidated Government Is a Tyranny. |
| #10: | On The Preservation of Parties, Public Liberty Depends. |
| #11: | Unrestricted Power Over Commerce Should Not Be Given The National Government. |
| #12: | How Will The New Government Raise Money? |
| #13: | The Expense of The New Government. |
| #14: | Extent of Territory Under Consolidated Government Too Large to Preserve Liberty or Protect Property. |
| #15: | Rhode Island Is Right! |
| #16: | Europeans Admire And Federalists Decry The Present System. |
| #17: | Federalist Power Will Ultimately Subvert State Authority. |
| #18-20: | What Does History Teach? (Part I) What Does History Teach? (Part II) |
| #21: | Why The Articles Failed. |
| #22: | Articles of Confederation Simply Requires Amendments, Particularly For Commercial Power And Judicial Power; Constitution Goes Too Far. |
| #23: | Certain Powers Necessary For The Common Defense, Can And Should Be Limited. |
| #24: | Objections to a Standing Army. (Part I) |
| #25: | Objections to a Standing Army. (Part II) |
| #26: | The Use of Coercion by The New Government. (Part 1) |
| #27: | The Use of Coercion by The New Government. (Part 2) |
| #28: | The Use of Coercion by The New Government. (Part 3) |
| #29: | Objections to National Control of the Militia. |
| #30-31: | A Virginia on the Issue of Taxation. |
| #32: | Federal Taxation and the Doctrine of Implied Powers. (Part I) |
| #33: | Federal Taxation and the Doctrine of Implied Powers. (Part II) |
| #34: | The Problem of Concurrent Taxation. |
| #35: | Federal Taxing Power must Be Restrained. |
| #36: | Representation and Internal Taxation. |
| #37: | Factions and the Constitution. |
| #38: | Some Reactions to Federalist Arguments. |
| #39: | Appearance and Reality– the Form Is Federal; the Effect Is National. |
| #40: | On the Motivations and Authority of the Founding Fathers. |
| #41-43 Part 1: | The Quantity of Power The Union Must Possess Is One Thing; The Mode of Exercising The Powers Given Is Quite a Different Consideration. (Part I) |
| #41-43: Part 2 | The Quantity of Power the Union must Possess Is One Thing; (Part 1) the Mode of Exercising the Powers Given Is Quite a Different Consideration. (Part II) |
| #44: | What Congress Can Do; What a State Can Not. |
| #45: | Powers of National Government Dangerous to State Governments; New York as an Example. |
| #46: | Where Then Is the Restraint? |
| #47: | “Balance” of Departments Not Achieved under New Constitution. |
| #48: | No Separation of Departments Results in No Responsibility. |
| #49: | On Constitutional Conventions. (Part I) |
| #50: | On Constitutional Conventions. (Part 2) |
| #51: | Do Checks and Balances Really Secure the Rights of the People? |
| #52: | On the Guarantee of Congressional Biennial Elections. |
| #53: | A Plea for the Right of Recall. |
| #54: | Apportionment And Slavery: Northern And Southern Views. |
| #55: | Will the House of Representatives Be Genuinely Representative? (Part 1) |
| #56: | Will the House of Representatives Be Genuinely Representative? (Part 2) |
| #57: | Will the House of Representatives Be Genuinely Representative? (Part 3) |
| #58: | Will the House of Representatives Be Genuinely Representative? (Part 4) |
| #59: | The Danger of Congressional Control of Elections. |
| #60: | Will the Constitution Promote the Interests of Favorite Classes? |
| #61: | Questions and Comments on the Constitutional Provisions Regarding the Election of Congressmen. |
| #62: | On the Organization and Powers of the Senate. (Part 1) |
| #63: | On the Organization and Powers of the Senate. (Part 2) |
| #64: | On the Organization and Powers of the Senate. (Part 3) |
| #65: | On the Organization and Powers of the Senate. (Part 4) |
| #66: | On The Power of Impeachment |
| #67: | Various Fears Concerning the Executive Department. |
| #68: | On the Mode of Electing the President. |
| #69: | The Character of the Executive Office. |
| #70: | The Powers and Dangerous Potentials of His Elected Majesty. |
| #71: | The Presidential Term of Office. |
| #72: | On The Electoral College; on Re-eligibility of the President. |
| #73: | Does the Presidential Veto Power Infringe on the Separation of Departments? |
| #74: | The President as Military King. |
| #75: | A Note Protesting the Treaty-making Provisions of the Constitution. |
| #76-77: | An View of the Appointing Power under the Constitution. |
| #78-79: | The Power of the Judiciary. (Part 1) |
| #80: | The Power of the Judiciary. (Part 2) |
| #81: | The Power of the Judiciary. (Part 3) |
| #82: | The Power of the Judiciary. (Part 4) |
| #83: | The Federal Judiciary and the Issue of Trial by Jury. |
| #84: | On the Lack of a Bill of Rights. |
| #85: | Concluding Remarks: Evils under Confederation Exaggerated; Constitution must Be Drastically Revised Before Adoption |
